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Summary
SimulatingNonlinear Tax Rules and Nonstandard Behavior
An Application to the Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions
This paper examines how the tax simulation method can be extended to
incorporate nonlinear budget constraints and nonstandard economic behavior. We
simulate the effect of extending the charitable deduction to nonitemizers and
study the effect of alternative "floors".
The specific simulations indicate that the econometric evidence on
charitable giving implies that extending the charitable deduction to nonitemi—
zers would raise individual giving by about 12 percent of the existing total
amount or $)4.5 billion at 1917 levels.The extension would reduce tax revenue by
slightly less, about $I.i billion. A floor of $300 or 3 percent of AGI would
reduce the revenue loss by 30 to L0 percent, even if there is significant
bunching. The effect of the floor on increased giving depends critically on
whether taxpayers' behavior is guided by conventional demand principles or by
the net altruism rule. A reasonable conclusion is that a floor would reduce
giving by less than the increased revenue but that the difference between them
would not be very large.
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Lawrence Lindsey
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
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The effect of existing tax rules on charitable contributions has been
the subject of several econometric studies in recent years.' The present paper
uses the results of those studies as the basis for examining the potential
effects of alternative tax rules that might be applied in extending the
charitable deduction to nonitemizers.2 Our focus is on the effect that such
changes in tax rules would have on charitable contributions, on tax liabilities,
and on the distribution of these effects by income class.
Our methodological emphasis is on simulating behavioral responses to
nonlinear tax rules, e.g., a rule that allows noniterrizers to deduct charitable
gifts in excess of $300 per year. We examine three types of response to such
nonlinear rules. The first is based on conventional demand analysis with a
nonlinear budget constraint. The second recognizes that individuals have an
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EconomicResearch. They are grateful to the members of the Tax Simulation
Project, and especially to Daniel Feenberg andDanielFrisch, for helpful
discussions, to the NBER and National Science Foundation for support of this
research,and to Harvey Galper for valuable comments on the previous version.
Theviews expressed here are the authors' and should not be attributed to any
organization.
See Boskin and Feldsteiri (1971), lotfelter (1980), Clotfelter andSteuerle
(1980), Feldstein (1975), FeldsteinandClotfelter (1976), Feldstein and Taylor
2 A variety of proposals to extend the charitable deduction have been made
over the years, especially when other tax changes reduce the fraction of tax-
payers who itemize their personal deductions. One recent proposal is contained
in the bill introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressmen Fisher and
Moynihan and Packwood (S. 219, 96th Congress, 2nd session). For a copy of the
bill and further analysis, see "Hearings before the Subcommittee on Taxation and
Debt Management generally and theCommittee onFinance, United States Senate,
January30 and 31, 1980."—2—
incentive to respond to a floor by "bunching" their contributions over time,
e.g., by contributing only in alternate years to reduce the fraction of total
contributions that are below the floor and therefore that do not receive the tax
benefit. The third approach departs from the usual utility maximization model
of demand to consider a quite different type of altruistic behavior that may be
appropriate for studying charitable contributions. The essential feature of
this approach is that it assumes each individual wishes to make charitable gifts
with some fixed net—of—tax cost; changes in tax rules alter the gross amount of
giving to maintain this net cost.
All three approaches are generally consistent with the available sta-
tistical evidence. The behavior of taxpayers under existing rules does not
allow a choice among the three rrdels; in statistical terms, the model is
underidentified. This underidentification does not affect predictions of the
effects of alternative linear tax rules, e.g., substituting a credit for the
existing deduction. Although the predicted effects of an alternative linear tax
rule does not depend on which of the three models is assumed to be
correct,3 with nonlinear tax rules the three models can have very different
implications. Predictions of the effects of nonlinear tax rules must therefore
be regarded as conditional on the model specification and any user of our analy-
sis must "weight" these conditional predictions by his own subjective probabili-
ties of the appropriateness of the model.
3 The choice between the third model and the first two does have some effect
on the estimated response to changes in tax rules, but the size of the effect
is relatively small.—3—
The simulations are all made with the National Bureau of Economic
Research TAXSIM Model. This computerized model, like the one used by the
Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation, bases its calculations on the
large stratified random sample of individual tax returns that are provided for
this purpose by the Internal Revenue Service. But unlike these other models,
the NBER TAXSIM model is specifically designed to take into account the response
of taxpayer behavior to changes in tax rules. The version of the model used in
the present paper is based on the tax law for 1977 and uses a sample of 23,111
individual tax returns for that year.5
The first section of the paper summarizes the previous econometric evi-
dence on charitable giving that forms the basis for the parameter values used in
the current simulations. Section 2 describes the alternative tax rules and the
three models of behavior that will be simulated. Some technical aspects of the
simulation procedure, including the imputation of contributions to nonitemizers
and the calculation of the effective cost of charitable gifts, are discussed in
section 3. The simulation results are presented in sections 4and5.There is
a brief concluding section.
The economists who have participated in the development of the TAXSIM model
are Daniel Feenberg, Martin Feldstein, Daniel Frisch, LarryLindsey,and Harvey
Rosen.
5 These 23,111 returns are a random 25 percent sample of the 1971 Treasury Tax
Model Public Use Sample._)4
1.Econometric Evidence on Charitable Giving
Since this paper will not present any new econometric evidence on
charitable giving, it is useful to review the previous econometric research.
The current tax law allows any taxpayer who itemizes his deductions to subtract
the value of charitable contributions in calculating taxable income. The
"price" of one dollar's contribution to a charitable organization in terms of
the foregone disposable income of the donor therefore varies inversely with his
marginal tax rate. Of course, for anyone who does not itemize his deductions,
the price of one dollar's contribution is one dollar of foregone disposable
income. 6
Thekey parameter that determines the effect of the existing charitable
deduction and of alternative linear tax rules is the price elasticity, i.e., the
elasticity of the individual's gross (pretax) charitable gift with respect to
the price of giving. The appropriate value is of course the partial elasticity,
holding constant the level of income and such other demographic characteristics
that might be associated with the price. Several studies in recent years, based
on quite different bodies of data, have concluded that the price elasticity of
giving is between —1.0 and —1.5. There is a striking degree of consistency and
relative precision in these estimates even though they are based on different
years and different types of data.
Feldstein (1915) used the data published by the Internal Revenue Service
on the mean level of charitable giving and the mean level of disposable income
6Thisignores the special problem of gifts of appreciated property, a subject
to which we return later.—5—
in each of 27 adjusted gross income (AGI) classes for the alternateyears be-
tween 19148 and 1968. These data refer only to individuals who itemized their
deductions. A constant elasticity specification wasestimated:
(i) ln Gjt b0 +b1in it +b2in Yit +ejt
where Git is the mean charitable gift of individuals in AGI class i inyear t,
Pt is the price calculated at the mean taxable income in that class, and
Y.t is the mean disposable income in that class. The changing tax rates as well
as the differences in the rates among classes were used to estimate the price
elasticity. The basic estimate in this study, with the sample restricted to
taxpayers whose AGI's were between $14,000 and $100,000 at 1967 prices, was —1.24
with a standard error of 0.10. Including all income classes in thesample
raised the elasticity to —1.146 with a standard error of 0.08.
Feldstejn and Clotfeiter (1976) used individual household data collected
by the Census Bureau in 1963 and 19614 for the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of
Financial Characteristics of Consumers. Their sample of 1,1406 individualspro-
vided information on wealth and demographic characteristics as well ason income
and charitable giving. The data made it possible to estimate for each household
the price of charitable giving and a measure of disposable income definedas the
total income received minus an estimate of the tax that would be due if no
contribution were made. The basic price elasticity estimate in this study was
—1.15(standarderror 0.20). Several variants of the basic equation showed that
the estimated price elasticity was not sensitive to the measurement ofpermanent
income or the inclusion of a variety of other demographic and economic charac-
teristics.—6—
Feldstein and Taylor (1916) used a similar specification to study a
sample of more than 15,000 taxpayers who itemized their deductions and whose tax
returns were included in the 1970 Treasury Tax File, a stratified random sample
of individual tax returns. The basic price elasticity estimate was —1.29
(standard error 0.06). Repeating this calculation for the 1962 Treasury Tax
file data showed a price elasticity of —1.09 (standard error 0.03). A price
elasticity estimate based on the change in the tax schedule between 1962 and
1970 was —1.39 (standard error 0.19).
Similar estimates were obtained in several other studies using different
sets of microeconomic data. Reece (1979) used the 1972—13 Consumer Expenditure
Survey of the BLS and estimated a price elasticity of —1.19 using a Tobit esti-
mating procedure. Dye (1977) studied a l974 Michigan Survey Research Center
survey of households with incomes under $50,000 and estimated a price elasticity
of —2.25. Clotfelter and Steuerle (1979), using tax data for 1975, estimated a
price elasticity of —1.25. And Clotfelter (1980), using the unstratified random
sample of tax returns for 1972, obtained a price elasticity of —l.40.
These estimates refer to the entire population or to all taxpayers who
itemized and not to any particular income class. The present analysis of the
potential effect of extending the charitable deduction to those who do not
currently itemize their deductions makes it particularly important to have an
estimated price elasticity for middle and lower income households; more than 90
percent of 1977 nonitemizers had adjusted gross incomes of less than $20,000.
Although separate estimates for each income class cannot be made as precisely as
for the sample as a whole, the evidence generally indicates that the relevant
elasticity for this group is as high as for the population as a whole.—7—
The pooled data by year and income class (Feldstein, 1915) was analyzed
in separate regressions for different income groups. For the 64 observations
with mean real income (in 1967 dollars) between $4,000 and $10,000, the esti-
mated price elasticity was —1.80 (standard error =0.56).Among taxpayers with
real incomes between $10,000 and $20,000, the corresponding estimate was —1.04
(standard error =0.76,with 27 observations).
Despite the small samples, these data had the advantage of tax schedules
that varied over time. When attention is limited to a single cross section of
individual data, it is more difficult to estimate separate equations in each
income class. This is particularly true in the low and middle income classes
where there is a very high correlation between income and tax rates.7 It is
nevertheless possible to allow the estimated price elasticity to vary with
income or marginal tax rate while estimating the other parameters from the
entire sample.
The Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) study found that the price elasti-
city was greatest for those with the highest "price of giving"; the estimated
elasticity was —1.82 (with a standard error of 0.64) for those with a price of
giving in excess of 0.7 and then fell to —1.26 (s.e. =0.42)for those with a
price between 0.3 and 0.7 and to —1.16 (s.e. =0.20)for those with a price
below 0.3. The differences are not statistically significant but, if anything,
provide evidence that the current nonitemizing population has a higher elasticity.
The Feldstein and Taylor (1976) study had a nuch larger sample and could
I In higher income classes, there is nuchmore variation in tax rates at each
level of adjusted gross income as well as substantial income variation within
tax brackets.—8—
therefore obtain estimates with smaller standard errors. Theestimatedprice
elasticities varied inversely with income, from —2.26 (s.e. =0.2)for tax-
payers with incomes below $10,000 and —1.82 (s.e. 0.2)4) for taxpayers with
incomes between $10,000 and $20,000 to —1.11 (s.e. =0.09)for those with
incomes between $50,000 and $100,000 and —1.21 (s.e. =0.06)for those with
incomes over $100,000. An analogous equation for 1962 is not reported.
Estimates of separate price and income elasticities in each income class give
implausible values for the lowest income class (those with AGI between $)4000 and
$20,000): —3.67 (s.e. =0.145)for 1962 and —0.35 (s.e. =0.52)for 1970.
In a separate study designed to measure the price elasticity for the
lower and middle income groups, ]3oskin and Feldstein (1977) used survey data
collected in 197)4 by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center on house-
holds with incomes below $30,000. Because these are survey data rather than tax
return data, they contain information on contributions by nonitemizers as well
as itemizers. This provides much more price variation at each income level.
The Boskin—Feldstein analysis estimated a price elasticity of —2.54 (s.e. =
0.28)for this group. An additional analysis of these data showed that the dif-
ference between itemizers and nonitemizers could be explained completely by the
price effect without recourse to a separate "itemization" effect.
Clotfelter and Steuerle (1979) estimated a variety of different specifi-
cations for separate income classes using the Treasury Tax Model for 1975. They
found that the estimated results in the lower income class were quite sensitive
to the particular specification. The basic logarithmic equation implied price
elasticities of —0.9 for incomes of $4,000 to $10,000 and —1.3 for incomes of
$10,000 to $20,000. Estimating a single equation for all income classes but—9—
using a more general functional form implied lover price elasticities; the esti-
mates ranged between —0.4 and —0.7. But constraining the coefficient to be the
same for all income classes reverses this effect and implies price elasticity of
—2.2 and In our view, this sensitivity shows the difficulty of trying to
infer separate elasticities for low and middle income groups.
Before turning to the simulations, it is useful to consider the plausi-
bility of a price elasticity between 1 and 2 for a typical nonitemizing family.
In 1977, families with adjusted gross incomes between $10,000 and $15,000 who
itemized their deductions gave an average of $522. If such a family had a
taxable income of $8000, the price per dollar of giving would be approximately
80 cents. A price elasticity of —1.0 and a price of 0.80 imply that deduc-
tibility raises giving by 25 percent; i.e., by $i0I from $1.18 to $522.
Similarly, a price elasticity of —2.0 would imply that deductibility raised
giving by 56 percent or by $188 from $33) to $522. Changes of this magnitude
are not contrary to intuition or to any other evidence.
To be conservative, the estimates developed in this paper will
generally be based on a price elasticity of —1.3. Some additional estimates
using price elasticities of —0.7, —1.0 and —1.6 will also be presented.
2. Extending the Contribution Deduction to Nonitemizers
The basic proposal to be analyzed in this paper allows all taxpayers to
deduct charitable contributions in the calculation of taxable income. !iore spe-
cifically, taxpayers who itemize other deductions would continue to include
charitable contributions as part of deductions as they presently do. Taxpayers
who do not itemize other deductions would be allowed to subtract their chari—-.10—
tablecontribution from gross income in the same way that they now subtract
an amount for each exemption. In this way, there is no change in adjusted gross
income or in any of the amounts that depend on it.
This basic scheme might he modified by limiting the charitable deduction
of nonitemizers to the excess over some dollar amount or some percentage of the
taxpayers adjusted gross income. A rationale for such a "floor" is that the
standard deduction implicitly recognizes some minimal or typical charitable gift
so that individuals should get an explicit deduction only for the excess over
that amount.8 An alternative rationale for a floor is that it can reduce the
loss of tax revenue and, to the extent that contributions exceed the floor
amount, the reduction in revenue loss would have no impact on the marginal
incentive to give. For example, in 19T1 taxpayers with AGI's between $15,000
and $20,000 who did not itemize made charitable gifts averaging nearly $).OO.
For someone giving an average amount, a $300 floor would have no effect at the
margin on the incentive to give. The current paper analyzes two alternative
floors: the first is $300 and the alternative is 3 percent of adjusted gross
income (AGI).
2.1 The Conventional Demand Model
The effects of extending the charitable deduction to noniteniizers, and
particularly the effectsof the floors, depends on the type of individual beha—
viorthat is assumed. The most basic behavioral assumption, and the one that
8Thelogic of that argument is hardly compelling. If the charitable deduc-
tion is extended to nonitemizers, itwouldbe more appropriate to reduce the
standarddeduction by the currently assumed amount of the "typical" gift and
then allow all individuals the full amount of their deduction.—11—
underlies the specification of the econometrically estimated equations, is that
individual giving responds to a change in price according to the constant
elasticity formula:
(2.1) G1 =G0(P1/P0)a
where G1 is the level of annual giving after the "reform," G0 is the level of
annual giving before the reform,9 P0 is the price before the reform,1-°1
the price after the reform, andis the price elasticity of demand. There is
no need to adjust separately for the change in disposable income since the esti-
mated price elasticity includes the income effect as well as the substitution
effect; i.e., the initial econometric equation defines the disposable income as
AGI minus the tax that would be due if the individual made no charitable
contribution.
More specifically, equation 2 describes what is essentially theresponse
of noniteinizers (i.e., those who under existing law are nonitemizers) when they
are allowed to deduct charitable gifts. For most itemizers, the proposal
involves no change in behavior. however, about 6 percent of current itemizers
would cease to itemize if they could then deduct their charitable contributions;
i.e., their itemized deductions excluding charitable contributions is less than
9 The method of imputing an initial level ofgiving for noniteniizers is
discussed in section 3 of this paper.
10 For nonitemizers,P0 differs from one only because of gifts of appreciated
property. This difference is discussed in section 3. Although as a practical
matter, the difference from one for this group is small enough to ignore com-
pletely, our price calculations do reflect for each individual the average per-
centage of appreciated property in total contributions.—12—
the standard deduction to which they would be entitled.11 For most of these
"switchers" there is no change in marginal tax rate and therefore no change in
price. However, since an individual only switches if his tax bill is reduced,
there is a small income effect. The giving of a switcher can be calculated
according to the equation:
(2.2) G1 =G0(P1/P0)(y1/y0)
where Y0 is the initial value of total income minus the tax liability if the
individual made no contribution and Y1 is the corresponding value if the indivi-
dual stops itemizing and uses the standard deduction.'2 The difference between
Y1 and Y0 is the tax that the individual saves by switching from itemizing to
using the standard deduction, given that the charitable contribution is deduc-
tible in any case.
Although the demand behavior implied by equation 2.1 is adequate for
estimation and for simulating alternative linear budget constraints, it is
inadequate for analyzing alternative nonlinear budget constraints. Figure 1
illustrates the nature of this problem in a simple case. The standard deductor
initially faces a budget line INW with a slope of —l between giving (G) and
other spending (c). He chooses point E1. Allowing standard deductors to take
an additional deduction for charitable gifts above a floor (F) puts a kink in
the budget line which becomes UVX.
11In 1911, the standard deduction was $3200 for a married couple and $2200
for a single individual.
12 An income elasticity of 0.7' is used in the calculations; see Feldstein and
Taylor (1976) for supporting evidence. Because the relevant income changes are
always very small, the results are very insensitive to the choice of this
elasticity.Figure 1


















U CIn the case shown in Figure LA, the individual was giving more than
the floor even without the deduction. For such an individual, the deductibility
with a floor is equivalent to an ordinary price change except for an offsetting
negative income effect equal to mF where m is the individual's marginal tax
rate. This case could therefore be analyzed using the demand function of
equation 2.2 with appropriate definitions of P1 and Y1.
In the case shown in Figure 113, the individual was giving less than
the floor. The change in the budget constraint therefore occurs in an irrele-
vant section of the budget constraint and the individual continues to give at
E1. This could also be analyzed using the demand function, since the price is
unchanged for this individual.
But the choice in figure 1C cannot be analyzed with the demand func-
tion. The individual initially gives an amount less than the floor F. But the
individual's indifference curve cuts the new branch of the budget constraint,
implying that the individual's optimum point is on the new branch. This can
only be determined by an explicit utility comparison.
In order to be able to deal with situations like figure 1C, we there-
fore continue the analysis with the help of an explicit utility function that
implies the constant elasticity demand structure of equation 2.2. We follow
Hausnan (1979) and write the indirect utility function of individual i as:
l+ct 1—S
(2.3) Vj (p,y) =—ki +31
Thisindirect utility function implies a demand function with constant price
elasticity cx and constant income elasticity S .Sinceexisting law provides a—15—
linear budget constraint for small changes in giving,13 we can use the price and
income elasticities estimated in previous studies with equation 2.1 to parame—
tize this utility function. The value of ki for individualcan then be calcu-
lated as the value which causes the demand for giving implied by equation 2.3
for individual i to equal the actual observed amount of giving.
With the help of such a parametized indirect utility function for
each individual, we proceed in the following way to calculate the value that
each individual would give if nonitemizers could deduct gifts in excess of floor
F. (To simplify the description of our procedure, we now ignore gifts of appre-
ciated property and the possibility that giving causes the individual to change
tax brackets.1)
First, if the initial giving of individual I (Goj) exceeds the floor
(F), we can use equation 2.3 to calculate the new level of giving by reducing
the price from 1 to 1—mi (where m is the individual's marginal tax rate and by
lowering the individual's income by mF. We then use these values to calculate
the new level of giving, G11. This corresponds to figure 1A.
If G01 is less than th& floor, we consider first the potential
reaction if the individual faces the reduced price above the floor. If with
this price (and the associated income correction) the implied giving is still
less than the floor, we know we are in case lB in which giving is unchanged. If
however, the implied giving is greater than the floor, we are in case C and rrnst
13 There is a nonlinearity for the few individuals whose giving causes them
to switch brackets or to move from nonitemize to itemize. Ignoring the switch
from nonitemizer to itemizer biases the estimated price elasticity toward zero.
l4 The full computer program recogizes both of the possibilities. The
method of dealing with property gifts is discussed in Section 3. Changes in tax
brackets are reflected by using the new marginal price and changing the initial
level of income.—16—
choose between the possibilities by comparing the irrrplied utilities. Condition-
al on the assumption that the individual will not change his giving (i.e., will
remain at E1 in figure 1C because the indifference curve tangent to the new sec-
tion of the budget line is lower than the indifference curve tangent at E1), we
evaluate the utility at the initial price (pi =1)15and unchanged income, say
V0. Then, conditional on the assumption that the individual increases his
giving (i.e., moves to point E2 in figure lC) we take Pi to be the itemized
price =1—mi,except for gifts of appreciated property) and reduce income by
m1F. This implies an increased value of giving Gli and an associated utility
value V. The choice between the two points is then done by comparing V0 and
for the individual.
An analogous calculation is used to analyze the possibility that an
individual who is currently an itemizer might switch to using the standard
deduction if he could continue to itemize his charitable gifts. To decide
whether to switch, the individual compares his utility level as an itemizer with
the utility level that he would achieve as a nonitemizer who can deduct his
charitable giving. In practice, about 6 percent of current itemizers would
find that it is desirable to use the standard deductions when charitable gifts
become eligible for a separate deduction.
2.2 The Bunching of Gifts
The use of a floor provides an incentive for individuals to "bunch"
their charitable giving. With a $300 floor, a nonitemizer who gives $300 each
year would get no tax reduction. By giving $600 every other year, the indivi—
15 In the actual calculations, p is lower than one because of gifts of appre-
ciated property.—17—
dual would also have a $300 tax deduction every otheryear, or a 50 cent deduc-
tion per dollar of contribution. And by giving $900every third year, the
deduction would rise to 67 cents per dollar of gift. Although the 'logical'
extreme is of course implausible because of the resulting effect on the
individuals' marginal tax rates and because individuals and institutions both
have reasons to favor a steady flow of giving, thepresence of a floor seems
very likely to lead to some bunching.
There is, unfortunately, no experience with charitable deduction floors
that can be used to estimate thier likely effect on bunching. We have however
constructed two alternative simulation models and tested the parametricsen-
sitivity of the results.
Both models assume that the extent of bunching depends on the potential
tax saving from bunching and therefore on both the size of the contribution and
the individual's marginal tax rate. In both models, thepossibility of bunching
is limited to a two year cycle. The first model assumes that each individual
bunches either all of his contributions or none. That is, if he isa "buncher,"
he gives only in alternate years. The probability of beinga buncher depends on
the tax incentive. The second model assumes thateveryone is a "partial
buncher;" some fraction of his total giving is bunched (i.e., given only in
alternate years) while the rest of his contribution is givenevery year. We
will now describe these models as they apply to someone who iscurrently a
nonitemizer.16
16 Foritemizers, the possibility of switching is again evaluated by comparing
the tax liability as an itemizer with the tax liability as anonitemizer, but
this time including the effect of bunching.—18—
The tax incentive to bunch is a function of the relative cost of giving
with and without bunching. Let Gi be the amount that individual i (a nonite—
mizing taxpayer) would give if charitable gifts in excess of a floor could be
deducted.1-T Let CG11 be the net cost to individual i of making this charitable
gift in a single year, i.e., without bunching. CGi is equal to G1 reduced by
the tax saving associated with the contribution, i.e., the tax saving that
results from deducting the excess of G11 over the floor. Similarly, let
BCG11 be the net cost of making this charitable gift by bunching two years'
gifts into a single year.18 We assume that the propensity to bunch depends on
the ratio of these net costs: BCG/CG.
More specifically, the first model assumes that the probability that
individual i will bunch is given by
(2.) PROB1 =1—(BcG1/cG1)P
with p >0.Note that under current law, with no floor, there is no incen-
tive to bunch19: BCG =CGand PROB =0.However, a floor on the charitable
deductions implies BOG <CGand therefore PROB >0.The greater the value of
p ,the more sensitive is the probability of bunching to the relative cost. To
appreciate the order of magnitude of this effect, consider a taxpayer who would
contribute 4O0 dollars without bunching (Gii1400) and whose marginal tax rate
17 The calculation of Gli was described in Section 2.1.
18 This is calculated by finding the tax reduction associated with contri-
buting 2G11, i.e., the tax saving that results from deducting the excess of
2Gli over the floor, and then subtracting half of this tax saving from Gii.
19 This assumes that the individual connot predict year—to—year changes in his
marginal tax rate. In fact, there is some predictable variation and therefore
some incentive to bunch. Although we believe this is likely to be small, some
investigation with the longitudinal tax rule would be worthwhile.—19—
is 30 percent. With a 300 dollar floor, the cost of giving is 370 dollars with
no bunching and 325 dollars with bunching. Thus PROB =1—(325/370)P=1—
(o.88)P.If p =2,PROB =0.23while p =0.5implies PROB =0.06and p =10
implies PROB =0.73.Since econometric evidence about p is unavailable, the
simulations show the sensitivity of the conclusions to alternative values of
Of course, those individuals who bunch change the amount of their gift
because of bunching. If, without bunching, the individual's gift would be below
the floor while bunching makes the gift (in the year in which it is given)
greater than the floor, there is a reduction in the price of giving and there—
fore an incentive to give more. Among those whose gift would be above the floor
without bunching, bunching has a positive income effect on the amount of the
gift.
In general, a floor reduces the loss of tax revenue that results from
extending the deduction to nonitemizers and reduces also the incentive to give
associated with such an extension. Bunching increases the revenue loss but,
unless there is complete bunching, still leaves a smaller revenue loss than with
no floor. However, even with bunching the incentive to give is not as great as
without a floor. Whether the floor raises or lowers the tax revenue "loss" per
dollar of induced extra giving is an empirical question that we will examine in
section five with the help of the simulations.
The alternative "partial bunching" model assumes that all taxpayers
bunch some of their giving if there is a floor and that the extent of bunching
depends on the cost ratio, BCG/CG. The idea of partial bunching is based on the
asymmetry of information between donors and donees. Much giving is done in
response to requests for contributions and is done in a way that the donee orga——20—
nization and others know the amount of the donor's gift. The individual who
responds to a request for a contribution by saying "I give every other year and
this is my off year" may not be credible. Individuals may also prefer to appear
more generous, especially for relatively small amounts, by appearing to ignore
tax considerations. And making a contribution may seem better than trying to
explain the tax law to the sellers of Girl Scout cookies or Little League
decals.
We assume that the specific incentive to partial bunching is of the same
form as equation 2.4:
(2.5) =1—(EcGi1/cGi)
where PROPi is the proportion of the charitable gift that individual ibunches.
The amounts of the gifts in the "low" and "high" giving years depends on the
interaction between bunching, floors and tax saving. For example, if (i —
PROP)Giis greater than the floor, bunching does not change the price of
giving in either year but does have an income effect that raises giving to (say)
G2i. In this case, the individual gives (1 —PROPi)G2iin the low year and (1 +
PROPi)G2jin the high year. Alternatively, if Gi is less than the floor but
(i+PROP)Giexceeds the floor, there are both price and income effects in the
"high"year but only an income effect in the "low" year. We assume that in the
"high"year the individual in this case gives (1 +PROP)Gi(Pi/Po)(1/0)
where P1 reflects the marginal deductability and Y1 differs from Y0 because of
the effects of the floor (which lowers y1) and the bunching (which raises Y1).
Although the income—effect adjustments are not precise, they are relatively—21—
small and further elaborations or refinements have no significant effects.2°
There is one further aspect of the partial bunching model that deserves
comment. In the case in which giving without bunching substantially exceeds the
floor, the equation that describes partial bunching mightstillleave giving in
both years at levels above the floor. Since in that case there is no gain from
bunching, we assume that the proportion bunched is actually zero.
The difference between the effects of the two models of bunching depends
on the taxpayer's initial situation. There are cases in which partial bunching
would save no tax and have no effect on giving while total bunching would do
both. There are other cases in which partial bunching would have a larger total
effect on both giving and tax receipts. The net balance is examined in section
5withthe help of the simulations.
2.3 Net Altruism
Although charitable giving can be modelled like other types of consumer
spending, it is worth considering the possibility that charitable behavior is
actually "different." Individuals may make charitable gifts because of a sense
of responsibility, religious devotion, altruism, guilt, or other considerations
that cause behavior to differ from traditional utility maximization. We
emphasize '"because,even with these motivations, actual charitable giving
might behave just as traditional theory predicts. Certainly the normal price
and income elasticities found in the econometric studies are consistent with
this.
But individuals might think about charitable giving in terms of their
desire to "sacrifice" or to contribute their "fair share" rather than in terms
20 See footnote 15.—22—
of the benefits that they can achieve for the donee organization. In this case,
the deductibility of charitable gifts has the effect of reducing the donor's
"sacrifice" or "net contribution." To achieve the initial level of sacrifice,
the donor must increase the size of his contribution. If the individual wishes
to make a fixed sacrifice regardless of the tax law, full deductibility (with no
floor) causes the individual to behave as if he had a price elasticity of —1;
that is, G1 =G0(P1/P0)—1since this implies a constant net cost of giving,
P101 =P0Gj.
Although the econometric evidence suggests that the price elasticity is
absolutely larger than one, the possibility of a price elasticity of minus one
cannot be ruled out. If the observed price elasticity were minus one, the
available evidence could not be used to distinguish between the traditional
demand model and the alternative "net sacrifice" or "net altruism" model. With
no floor, the two models are observationally equivalent.
The presence of a floor causes a substantial difference between the con-
ventional demand model (with a price elasticity of minus one,) and the "net
altruism" model. Consider an individual who, with no deductibility, contributes
$400and whose marginal tax rate is 30 percent. The net cost to such an indivi-
dual is $1400. Allowing deductibility with no floor causes the contribution to
rise to 1400(0.7)- =571dollars. With a 300 dollar floor, the conventional
model predicts that giving will fall short of 571 dollars only because of a
small income effect; the extra tax of 90 dollars caused by the floor would
reduce giving by about 5 dollars. But the 300 dollar floor implies that the
"net altruist" must give substantially less than 571 dollars to maintain the
original 1400 dollar net cost. In particular, a total gift of 41-t3 dollars would
have a net cost of 1400 dollars.—23—
The possibility that individuals decide on the basis of total net cost
rather than marginal net cost implies that a floor does not reduce the loss in
tax revenue per dollar of induced additional giving. In the example of the pre-
vious paragraph, deductibility with no floor would cause giving to rise by 171
dollars and tax revenue to fall by 171 dollars (0.3 x 571). Deductibility with
a 300 dollar floor would cause giving to rise by )43 dollars and tax revenue to
fall by )43 dollars (0.3 x l43).
The implications of the "net altruism" model will be considered as part
of the simulations in section 5.
3. SomeTechnical Aspects of the Simulation Procedure
As we noted in the introduction to this paper, our simulations use the
NBER TAXSIM model with the 1977 tax law. Oursampleof 23,111 returns is a one—
in—four random sample from the Treasury's Public Use File of 1977 tax returns.
In simulating the effect of any tax change proposal, we use the model to
calculate consistent values for each individual of the price of giving under the
new law, the amount that that individual gives, and the individual's new tax
liability. The entire TAXSIN model with all features of the tax code are used
in these calculations. By using the sampling weights provided by the Treasury,
we can then aggregate the individual changes in giving and in tax liabilities to
obtain estimates for all taxpayers and for taxpayers in each income class.
Two technical issues in the simulation deserve special attention: (1)
the calculation of the price of giving, and (2) the estimation of the initial
level of giving of nonitemizers.—21k—
3.1 The Price of Giving
The price of giving is defined as the net cost to the taxpayer of a
marginal increase in the charitable contribution. In the simple case of full
deductibility, there wouldbea difference between this "last dollar price" and
theprice associated with the first dollar of giving only if the individual
gives enough to change his marginal tax rate. For most taxpayers, and espe-
cially for those in the income classes that currently do not itemize, the level
of giving is low enough that there would be little or no difference between
the first and last dollar prices. When there is a difference, we use the last
dollar price and adjust the income term for the effect of the difference between
the marginal and inframarginal prices.
The difference between the first dollar price and the last dollar
price is particularly important when there is a floor. In all cases, the simu-
lation algorithim uses a procedure that converges on the marginal price that is
consistent with the predicted level of giving.
In calculating the price of giving it is not enough to use the margi-
nal tax rate that the individual faces on additional earnings. There are two
reasons for this. First, a one dollar charitable gift and a one dollar decrease
in earnings can affect the individual's taxliabilitydifferently for a number
of reasons. The charitable gift can interact with the maximumtaxon earned
income and the deduction limitation while a change in earnings alters adjusted
gross income and therefore the deductions and limits that depend on AGI. We
avoid these problems by using the TAXSIM model to calculate explicitly the
effect on the tax liability of a one dollar charitable gift.21
21 To reduce rounding error problems,we actually calculate the effect of a
ten dollar gift.—25—
The second problem is that individuals may contribute property as well
as cash. When securities or other appreciated property is given to charity, the
taxpayer deducts the market value of the assets and pays no tax on the capital
gain.22To the extent that the taxpayer uses appreciated assets to make his
gifts, this provision of the law reduces the cost of giving. Moreover, this
aspect applies to nonitemizers as well as to itemizers.
There are three problems involved in reflecting gifts of appreciated
property in the price variable: (1) What fraction of total giving takes the form
of appreciated property? (2) What fraction of the value of the appreciated pro-
perty is gain that would otherwise be taxed? and (3) What is the relevant
effective tax rate? We follow the procedure used in the earlier econometric
studies from which the price elasticity was derived. We calculate each tax-
payers price as a weighted average of the price of cash gifts and the price (or
cost) of gifts of appreciated property using as weights the average fractions of
both types of gifts in the taxpayer's AGI class.23 If the taxpayer would other-
wise have sold the contributed property immediately, the extra tax saving per
dollar of gift associated with giving the property to charity is the product of
22 This is consistent with the general proposition that a gift of appreciated
property does not constitute "recognition" of the gain and that the recipient of
the property has the same basis as the donor. Since a charity is not taxed
on its own capital gains, the carryover of the basis is irrelevant.
23 The fraction of total gifts that takes the form of property rises from about
3.5 percent for taxpayers with AGI's below $15,000 to more than 70 percent for
taxpayers with AGI's over $100,000.—26—
the marginal tax rate on capital gains (mc) and the ratio of "gain" to value in
the property that is contributed (g/v). Since the taxpayer also has the option
of postponing the sale of the property or giving the property to another indivi-
dual, the actual tax saving is less than mc(g/v), say A mc(g/v). Although
the capital gains tax rate (mc) can be calculated explicitly for each indivi-
dual, neither A nor g/v is directly observable. In the previous econometric
work (Feldstein and Clotfelter, 1976; Feldstein and ylor, 1976), a maximum
likelihood procedure was used to estimate the product A (g/v) on the assumption
that this was the same for all individuals. The maximum likelihood value of
A (g/v) =0.50is used in the current calculation. Of course, since our focus in
this paper is on the low—and middle—income taxpayers who now do not itemize (or
who would stop itemizing if a separate charitable deduction were allowed), gifts
of appreciated property are relatively unimportant and any errors introduced by
our approximation are likely to be very small.
3.2The Giving of Nonitemizers
Although the tax return indicates the contributions of all taxpayers who
itemized their deductions, no information is available about the contribution of
nonitemizers under existing law. An initial value of giving, G0, must be
imputed to each nonitemizer before any of the calculations begin. This imputa-
tion is done by matching each nonitemizer to an"equivalent" itemizer and then
assigning to the nonitemizer the itemizer's gift scaled down to reflect the
price difference and any difference in income.—27'—
More specifically, our imputation program read in parallel separate
computer tapes for the nonitemizers and the itemizers. For each noniternizer,
the program looked at successive itemizers until a record was found with the
same adjusted gross income class. The giving and the price of the itemizer, GI
and P1, were then used to calculate a trial value of giving for the nonitemizer
(GN) according to the formula GN =GI(PI/PNI)_a(YI/yNI)._.This in effect
assigns to the noniteriizer the level of giving that the "matched" itemizer would
have made if he had not been allowed to deduct his contribution, witha further
correction for the difference between their disposable incomes.
Of course, some itemizers only choose to itemize because they make
large charitable gifts; without their charitable deduction, they wouldpay less
tax as nonitmeizers. It would be wrong to include these individuals in the
group of itemizers used to impute giving to nonitemizers since the imputed
giving would be too high for a nonitemizer. We therefore deleted thisgroup in
the imputation process.
Despite this, our procedure can still impute to a nonitemizer a level of
giving which is so high that, if he had made that contribution, he would have
chosen to itemize. We therefore truncate the imputed givingby imposing the
limit that the initial gift of a nonitemizer must not exceed thegreater of the
standard deduction reduced by 3 percent of AGI and $500.
)4•TheBasic Simulation Results
This section presents the simulation results based on the traditional
demand model of charitable giving. The analysiscompares the implications of
alternative price elasticities and examines the effects of two different floors
below which non—itemized gifts are not deductible.—28—
All of the calculations refer to 1977. The proposed changes are
regarded as modifications in the tax law as of 1977 and all dollar amounts are
based on the sample of actual tax returns for 1911. The calculations are not
forecasts of the short—run effects of a legislative change but simulations of
what 1977 might have looked like if the tax rules relating to charitable gifts
had 'always' been different.2
Table 1 describes the situation as it actually was in 1977 under the
existing tax rules.25 Approximately 23 million itemizers contributed a total of
nearly $19 billion. Since the tax returns contain no information about gifts
by nonitemizers, their "actual" behavior in 1977 under existing tax rules must
itself be estimated. This estimation procedure has already been described in
section 3.2. The final four columns of Table 1 present estimates corresponding
to four different price elasticities. It is clear that since most non—
itemizers have rather low marginal tax rates, the choice among the price elasti-
city assumptions has relatively little effect on the estimated total giving by
nonitemizers. The range of estimates is from $17.5 billion to $19.1 billion.
Table 2 summarizes the aggregate effects of alternative ways of
extending the charitable deduction to nonitemizers. These estimates include
not only the response of those who were nonitemizers in 1977 but also the
changes in taxes and in giving among itemizers who would switch to nonitemizer
status if the tax rule were changed.
214 See Clotfelter (1980) on the difference between the long—run and the short—
run responses to changes in tax rates. The response to a permanent change in
tax rules might however be more rapid than the response to transitory changes in
tax rates.
25 Although these figures do not correspond exactly to published IRS numbers
because we have used a sample of returns, the large size of the sample guaran-
tees that errors are very small.—29—
Consider, for example, the effect of full deductibility with a price
elasticity of —1.0. The simulations imply that this would increase giving by
$3.5billionand would reduce tax revenue by $4.0 billion. For the nonitemi—
zers alone, the price elasticity of 1.0 implies that the revenue loss would
exactly equal the increase in giving. The excess of the revenue loss over the
increased giving reflects the fact that previous itemizers who switch save
substantially more in taxes than the increase, if any, in their giving. The
"budgetary efficiency" estimate of 0.87 is the ratio of increased giving to
reduced taxes implied by extending full deductibility to nonitemizers if the
price elasticity is one.
A more realistic price elasticity of 1.3 implies a 29 percent higher
level of increased giving but only 2 percent greater revenue loss. The
budgetary efficiency value rises to 1.10, implying that charities receive an
additional $1.10 for each extra dollar of revenue foregone by the Treasury.
Limiting the deduction of gifts by nonitemizers to the excess over
$300 reduces both the revenue loss and the increased giving. With all these
elasticities, the increase in giving is reduced by much less than the fall in
revenue. With an elasticity of —1.3, for example, the $300 floor reduces the
additional giving by $900 million (from $4.506 billion to $3.608 billion) but
reduces the tax loss by nearly twice as much (from $4.ioi billion to $2.430
billion, a decline of $1.7 billion).
A floor equal to 3 percent of adjusted gross income instead of a flat
$300 has quite similar aggregate effects. With a price elasticity of—1.3,
giving falls $1.5 billion (from $4.506 billion to $3.039 billion) while the tax





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































increasing the floor from $300 to 3 percent of AGI actually reduces giving by
more than the saving in taxes; total giving falls an additional $569 million
while the tax loss is cut by only $148i million. The primary reason for this is
that the effect of the percent—of—AGI floor is concentrated more on those tax-
payers with high marginal tax rates for whom the relative reductions are large.
Table 3 shows the changes in the mean giving and tax liabilities in
each adjusted gross income class and, for reference, the initial levels of
giving and tax liabilities. These figures combine itemizers and nonitemizers.
All of the calculations are based on a price elasticity of —1.3.
Consider, for example, taxpayers in the $10,000 to $15,000 adjusted
gross income class. Of the 13.5 million taxpayers in this group, 10.5 million
were nonitemizers in 1971. Extending full deductibility of charitable gifts to
all taxpayers would cause giving to increase by an average of $714 and taxes to
fall by an average of $63. A $300 floor would reduce this increase in giving by
$20 but would lower the fall in taxes by $30. Baising the floor to 3 percent of
AGI instead of $300 would reduce giving by an average of $5 and would save an
average of $14 in taxes.
Note that full deductibility has its maximum effect on the giving and
taxes per return at the income levels between $15,000 and $20,000. Below
$10,000, the relatively low marginal tax rates provide less incentive while
above $20,000 the majority of taxpayers already itemize their deductions.
Imposition of a $300 floor would have virtually no effect on giving by
taxpayers with AGI's over $25,000 since most such taxpayers would give more than
$300 if deductibility were allowed.The absolute effect of the $300 floor on
the mean level of giving is also greatest among taxpayers with incomes between—33—
Table 3
Distribution of' Changes in Mean Contributors





















Less than $5,000 23,1455 208 11 5 5 5 3 14 14
$5,000—$lo,000 19,735 33)4 1437 61 524 146 32 52 35
$1o,000—$15,000 13,5)45 31414 1,206 714 63 514 33 249 29
$15,000—$20,000 11,918 1423 2,078 93 814 80 52 65 38
$2o,000—$25,000 7,789 146 3,026 61 59 149 32 29 18
$25,000—$3o,000 24,399 591 14,27)4 61 57 50 3)4 26 16
$3o,000—$50,000 24,763 865 6,879 50 50 146 35 214 15
Over $50,000 1,14193,81829,130 75 70 72 60 )4O 20
All Returns 87,0214 14214 1,913 52 147 141 28 35 22
Total
($billion)
87.021436.931 166.145614.506 14.1013.608 2.14303.039 1.9143
All calculations are based on a price elasticity of —1.3 and refer to all taxpayers,
including both current itemizers and noniternizers._3)4
$10,000and $20,000. By contrast, a floor equal to 3 percent of AGI has a verr
substantial effect on the gifts and taxes of relatively high income taxpayers.
A 3 percent floor virtually eliminates any tax saving for those with incomes
over $25,000. Although total giving is lower with a 3 percent of AGI floor than
with a $300 floor, giving by the large number of taxpayers with incomes under
$10,000 is slightly higher.
Although table 2 suggests that a floor would be an "efficient" way of
modifying the extension of the charitable deduction to all taxpayers (in the
sense that it saves substantially more tax revenue than it reduces charitable
giving), table 3 indicates that a floor would also significantly change the
distribution among income classes of both the increased giving and the reduced
tax liability. Similarly, table 3 makes it clear that the choice between a $300
floor and a 3 percent of AGI floor involves not only aggregate efficiency con-
siderations but also the income class distribution of the changes in giving and
in tax liabilities. Of course, differences in the income class distribution of
giving has significant effects on the types of charities that benefit.
5. Simulating Nonstandard Behavior
All of the calculations in section )4 were based on the conventional
static utility maximization model of consumer demand for charitable giving. The
more dynamic assumption that taxpayers respond to a floor by bunching contribu-
tions over time will be examined in the current section. The more radical
departure from conventional utility maximization, the net altruism model of
charitable giving, will also be considered.—35-
5.1Bunching
Any floor on the charitable deduction would provide taxpayers with an
incentive to "bunch" their charitable contributions, giving a high level of
contributions in some years and a low level in others. Because the existing law
does not contain such a floor, we have no evidence about the likely extent of
bunching. This section therefore presents simulation results for a rather broad
range of two—year bunching assumptions. The restriction to a two—year cycleis
significant and should be borne in mind in considering the results. All of the
simulations refer to a price elasticity of —1.3.
When a taxpayer responds to a floor by bunching his contributions, he
reduces the amount of his giving that is not deductible and thereby increases
the tax saving associated with any level of giving. 4oreover, to the extent
that annual unbunched giving would be less than the floor while bunched giving
exceeds the floor, the process of bunching also reduces the marginal price of
giving and thus encourages increased giving. These two effects apply to both
the "total bunching" and "partial bunching" models described in section 2.
Recall that, with the total bunching model, the probability that indi-
vidual i will bunch is given by
(5.1) PROB =1—(BcG1/cG1)
where CG1 is the net cost to taxpayer i of giving the amount that he would
choose to give in the presence of a floor if he does not bunch and BCG1 is the
net cost of giving that amount with bunching. Thble 14 presents simulation
results with four different values of the bunching sensitivity variable.
The striking feature of the results in this table is that bunching




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































example, a $300 floor with no bunching reduces giving by $898 million, from
$)4.506 billion to $3.608 billion. With the bunching described by the moderate
sensitivity value of p =2, the decline in giving is reduced from $898 million to
$861 million. Even with the high sensitivity value of p =10, giving is still
reduced by $7i.3 million. Indeed, even the limiting case in which everyone
who can benefit from bunching does bunch still leaves the extra giving $.21
million lower than without a floor.
The effect of bunching on tax revenue is limited in a similar way.
Without bunching, the $300 floor reduces the revenue loss by $l.67l billion,
from $L.10l billion to $2.130 billion. Even with the high sensitivity value of
p =10,the $l.67l billion revenue effect of the floor is reduced by only $175
million. This very small effect of bunching on the revenue loss reflects the
distribution of gifts by non—itemizers, particularly the large number of relati-
vely small gifts for which the floor would eliminate all or nearly all deduc-
tibility. An individual who would give less than $150 a year without bunching
would get no deduction even if he bunched completely. Andataxpayer who gives
$oo every other year instead of $200 each year still gets a deduction for only
one—fourth of his total giving.
Table 5 presents results for the "partial bunching" model in which all
taxpayers who can benefit from bunching do bunch at least part of their gift.
The results are similar to the probabilistic total bunching model of Table )4
butindicate even smaller effects on giving and tax revenue.26
Since there is no experience with floors on which to base empirical
estimates of the taxpayers' likely response, it is reassuring that the results
26 Thefigures for full and partial bunching with p =wouldbe exactly equal
if there were no gifts of appreciated property. The small difference in our


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of this section are not sensitive to a wide variation in assumptions about the
possible extent of bunching. It should, however, be borne in mind that only
two—year bunching was considered and that if taxpayers bunched over a longer
period the effects would be more substantial.
5.2 Net Altruism
The "net altruism" model of charitable giving described in section 2.3
implies that individuals choose the amount that they contribute to charity to
achieve a desired net cost to themselves. Individual differences in the desired
net cost reflect differences in income and taste. Alternative tax rules affect
charitable giving by altering the amount that individuals can contribute per
dollar of net cost. Anylossin tax revenue is matched by an equal increase in
charitable giving.
In the simple context of extending the charitable deduction without
any floor, net altruism is equivalent to a price elasticity of minus one for the
nonitemizers themselves. However, net altruism implies that the taxpayers who
switched from itemizing to using the standard deduction will add the resulting
tax saving to their charitable gifts. Moreover, where giving causes a reduction
in marginal tax rates, the net altruist contributes all of the intramarginal tax
saving while traditional demand behavior implies that intramarginal saving has
only a small income effect. The difference between the conventional demand
model with unitary price elasticity and the net altruism model is shown in the
first row of table 6.
The contrast between conventional demand and net altruism is cuch
greater when there are floors. Thble 6 shows that the conventional demand
model with a unitary price elasticity implies that a $300 floor causes giving—40—
Table6
TheEffect of Net AltruismBehavior
onAggregate Contributions and Tax Liabilities
Proposal Conventional Demand NetAltruism
with (=—l
Changesin Budgetary Changesin Budgetary
GivingTaxesEfficiency GivingTaxesEfficiency
Full De— 3.506 )4.0L2 0.867 3.871 3.9510.979
ductibil ity
$300 Floor 2.879 2.368 1.216 1.963 2.008 0.978
3 percent
of AGI 2.1t09 1.886 1.277 1.5)43 1.573 0.980
Floor
Changes in Giving and Taxes are stated in billions of 1917 dollars. See text
t'or definition of bunching sensitivity.—4i —
tofall by $600 million andincreasestax revenue $i.i billion. With net
altruism, the reduced deductibility hasarmich bigger effect on giving. Giving
falls by $1.9 billion and the tax revenue rises by an equal amount. The results
are similar if the floor is stated as a percent of adjusted gross income.
Ifthenet altruism model is true, extending the deduction with a
floordoes not have greater budgetary efficiency than full deductibility.
Introducing the floor in itself no longer increases tax revenue by more than it
reducesgiving. With net altruism, the principal reason for having a floor is
to reduce the scale and cost of extending deductibility. The floor would of
course also affect the income class distribution of the induced changes in
givingand tax payments andthereforethe mix of donees that benefit.
The choice between the net altruism model and the conventional demand
model cannot be settled decisively with the available evidence. To the extent
that the estimated price elasticity is significantly different from minus one,
the data do support a conventional demand analysis. But it is quite possible
that some individuals behave according to net altruism principles while the
behavior of others is best described by a conventional demand analysis. If so,
the observed price elasticity is a misleading guide to what would happen if
deductibility were extended with a floor. The results would then be some mix
between the net altruism behavior of Table 6 and the conventional demand
response with a price elasticity between —1.3 and —1.6.
6. Concluding Remarks
Theprimary purpose ofthepresent paper is methodological: to exa-
mine how tax simulation could be extended to incorporate nonlinear budget
constraints and nonstandard economic behavior. We have shown how econometricestimates derived under existing tax rules can be exended to deal with this
wider range of simulations. On those issues for which existing evidence is not
informative we have presented simulation that indicate the sensitivity of the
conclusion to the unknown aspects of behavior.
The specific simulations indicate that the econometric evidence on
charitable giving implies that extending the charitable deduction to noniterni—
zers would raise individual giving by about 12 percent of the existing total
amount or $1.5 billion at 1977 levels.The extension would reduce tax revenue by
slightly less, about $Li billion. A floor of $300 or 3 percent of AGI would
reduce the revenue loss by 30 to percent, even if there is significant
bunching. The effect of the floor on increased giving depends critically on
whether taxpayers' behavior is guided by conventional demand principles or by
the net altruism rule. A reasonable conclusion is that a floor would reduce
giving by less than the increased revenue but that the difference between them
would not be very large.
Inconclusion,itshouldperhaps be stressed that the appropriate tax
treatmentof charitable contributions depends on much more than the effects of
alternative tax rules on the magnitude and distribution of contributions and
taxes.Andrews (1972), for example, has argued that a correct definition of net
income requires deducting charitable gifts while Surrey (1973) has argued the
opposite. Feldstein (1980) has emphasized that a tax subsidy of individual
giving may be preferable to goverment spending for the same purpose even when a
dollar of tax revenue loss induces less than a dollar of additional giving if
individual giving is influenced by the level of government spending on the par-
ticular activity. Still others have emphasized the administrative and—1t3—
compliance problemz associated with extending the deduction to low income tax-
payers who are rarely audited. All these considerations are important but lie
beyond the scope of the current paper._14I
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